UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-25-2013

State v. Tappin Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40377

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Tappin Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40377" (2013). Not Reported. 1112.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1112

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

NO. 40377

)

v.

)

ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2012-712

)

MICHAEL WILLIAM TAPPIN,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)

REPLY BRIEF

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE DEBORAH A. BAIL
District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8712
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 2
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL. ...................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 4
The State Has Failed To Establish That Mr. Tappin's Issue
Was Not Preserved For Appeal. ..................................................................... 4
A. Introduction

............................................................................................. 4

B. Mr. Tappin's Motion To Suppress, By Raising The Overarching
Issue Of Whether The Officers' Traffic Stop Violated The
Fourth Amendment, Encompassed A Dual Inquiry Into Both
The Inception And The Scope And Duration Of The Stop ......................... 4
C. Alternatively, The District Court May Address Mr. Tappin's
Issue On Appeal Because It Was Decided By The
District Court ............................................................................................. 9
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 10
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) .................................................................. 6
Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829 (2002) ............................................................... 5, 7
Northcuttv. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351 (1990) .............................................. 9
State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554 (Ct. App. 2001) ................................................ 6, 7
State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550 (1998) ....................................................... 5, 9, 10
State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159 (2000) ................................................................ 8
State v. Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 509 n.2 (Ct. App. 2008) ................................... 5, 7
State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109 (2013) ............................................................ 5, 7
State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2004) ........................................................ 6
Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ........................................................................... 6
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) .................................................. 6, 7

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
After being arrested on drug charges, Michael Tappin filed a motion to suppress
the evidence gathered by the police as a result of a traffic stop.

The district court

denied the motion to suppress. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Tappin then pleaded
guilty to felony trafficking in heroin. Mr. Tappin's conditional plea reserved his right to
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. The district court imposed a
unified sentence of fifteen years, with ten years fixed. Mr. Tappin appealed, asserting
that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, because the officers
did not have reasonable suspicion to lawfully expand the traffic stop for investigation
into drug activity, and thus his consent to a search was ineffective.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State contends that Mr. Tappin's argument was not
raised to the district court, and Mr. Tappin is therefore precluded from raising the issue
on appeal; and that application of the correct legal standards to the district court's
findings of fact showed no error. (Resp. Br., pp.5-10.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's contention that Mr. Tappin's
argument was not raised to the district court, and Mr. Tappin is therefore precluded from
raising the issue on appeal. Mr. Tappin asserts that the State has failed to establish
that his issue was not preserved for appeal, because his motion to suppress, by raising
the overarching issue of whether the officers' traffic stop violated the Fourth
Amendment, encompassed a dual inquiry into both the inception and the scope and
duration of the stop. Alternatively, even if this issue had not been raised to the district
court in Mr. Tappin's motion to suppress, this Court may address his issue on appeal
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because it was decided by the district court. With regard to the other aspects of this
case, Mr. Tappin relies on the arguments presented in his Appellant's Brief and will not
repeat those arguments here.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Tappin's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Has the State failed to establish that Mr. Tappin's issue was not preserved for appeal?
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ARGUMENT
The State Has Failed To Establish That Mr. Tappin's Issue Was Not Preserved
For Appeal
A.

Introduction
Mr. Tappin asserts that the State has failed to establish that his issue was not

preserved for appeal. The State contends that Mr. Tappin's argument (that the district
court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, because the officers did not have
reasonable suspicion to lawfully expand the traffic stop for investigation into drug
activity, and thus his consent to a search was ineffective) "was not raised to the district
court and so may not be considered for the first time on appeal." (Resp. Br., p.7.) The
State's contention is incorrect. The State has failed to establish that Mr. Tappin's issue
was not preserved for appeal, because his motion to suppress, by raising the
overarching issue of whether the officers' traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment,
encompassed a dual inquiry into both the inception and the scope and duration of the
stop. Alternatively, this Court may address Mr. Tappin's issue on appeal because it was
decided by the district court.

8.

Mr. Tappin's Motion To Suppress, By Raising The Overarching Issue Of Whether
The Officers' Traffic Stop Violated The Fourth Amendment, Encompassed A Dual
Inquiry Into Both The Inception And The Scope And Duration Of The Stop
Mr. Tappin asserts that the State has failed to establish that his issue was not

preserved on appeal, because his motion to suppress, by raising the overarching issue
of whether the officers' traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment, encompassed a dual
inquiry into both the inception and the scope and duration of the stop. Therefore, this
Court may consider his argument that the district court erred when it denied his motion
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to suppress, because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to lawfully expand
the traffic stop for investigation into drug activity, and thus his consent to a search
was ineffective.
As the State recognizes (Resp. Br., p.7), the Idaho Supreme Court "has held that
ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." State v. DuValt, 131
Idaho 550, 553 (1998).
A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls
within certain specific and well-delineated exceptions. Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829,
833 (2002). "When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the defendant, the
State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement
is applicable." Id. Here, Mr. Tappin demonstrated that the officers initiated the traffic
stop without a warrant. (R., pp.62-63.) Thus, the State bore the burden to show that a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement is applicable to the traffic stop. See

Halen, 136 Idaho at 833.
Traffic stops are seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and are permissible
under the limited investigatory detention exception to the warrant requirement only
"when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has
committed, or is about to commit, a crime." State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 294 P.3d
1121, 1124 (2013).

Here, Mr. Tappin challenged the traffic stop in his motion to

suppress. (R., pp.56-57.) A motion to suppress challenging a traffic stop raises the
"overarching issue" of whether the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment.

See,

e.g., State v. Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 509 n.2 (Ct. App. 2008) (''The overarching issue of
the admissibility of the evidence was raised by [the defendant's] suppression
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motion .... "), State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554, 557-58 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[T]he
overarching 'issue' presented both to the trial court and on appeal was raised by [the
defendant's] motion . . . . That issue is whether the officers' entry into the motel room
violated the Fourth Amendment.")
The analysis of a traffic stop is a dual inquiry involving both the reasonableness
of the stop at its inception and the reasonableness of the scope and duration of the
stop.

The State acknowledges that "[a]n investigative detention must not only be

justified at its beginning, but must also be conducted in a manner that is reasonably
related in scope and duration to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place."

(Resp. Br., p.8 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983),

State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181 (Ct. App. 2004).)

Under the "dual inquiry for

evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop" adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), courts examine "whether the
officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." United

States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Thus, a motion to suppress challenging a traffic stop, by

raising the overarching issue of whether the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment,
necessarily involves a dual inquiry into both the inception and the scope and duration of
the stop.
Here, Mr. Tappin's motion to suppress, by raising the overarching issue of
whether the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment, encompassed a dual inquiry
into both the inception and the scope and duration of the stop. His motion to suppress
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asserted the following: "Under the Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 17, and the
United States Constitution, Amendment 4, that there was no legal cause to stop, detain
and arrest the Defendant and therefore, the State's action constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure."

(R., p.57.)

The motion to suppress therefore raised the

overarching issue of whether the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment.

See

Lusby, 146 Idaho at 509 n.2, Bower, 135 Idaho at 557-58.

By raising the overarching issue of whether the traffic stop violated the Fourth
Amendment, the motion to suppress encompassed a dual inquiry into both the inception
and the scope and duration of the stop. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682. The State bore
the burden to show that the traffic stop was permissible under the limited investigatory
detention exception to the warrant requirement, by demonstrating that the stop was
justified at its inception and that its scope and duration were reasonably related to the
circumstances that initially justified the stop. See id., Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 294 P.3d
at 1124, Halen, 136 Idaho at 833.
Mr. Tappin's issue on appeal (that the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress, because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to lawfully
expand the traffic stop for investigation into drug activity, and thus his consent to a
search was ineffective) deals with the scope and duration of the traffic stop, the second
part of the dual inquiry.

See id.

Therefore, this Court may address Mr. Tappin's

argument as part of the overarching issue, raised by the motion to suppress, of whether
the officers' traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment.
establish that Mr. Tappin's issue was not preserved for appeal.
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The State has failed to

The State cites State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 161-62 (2000), in support of its
argument that Mr. Tappin is precluded from raising the issue on appeal.
Br., p.7.)

However, this case is distinguishable from Holland.

(Resp.

In Holland, the

defendant's motion to suppress contained "only one ground for suppressing the
evidence: the per se illegality of a warrantless search." Holland, 135 Idaho at 161. On
appeal, the defendant argued "her motion to suppress should have been granted
because [the officer] lacked probable cause to stop the car she was riding in." Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the defendant in Holland "did not
expressly raise the issue of the stop in the trial court," because "[a] challenge to a
warrantless search . . . does not automatically bring into issue the justification of the
initial stop." Id. Further, the Court concluded that "the issue of the stop was also not
properly raised before the district judge," because the defendant's counsel withdrew the
line of questioning about the grounds for the stop during cross-examination of the
State's witness, and did not provide the judge with any legal or factual argument as to
why the State's evidence was insufficient to justify the stop. Id. "Based upon these few
passing references to the issue," the Court could not find "that the issue was actually
argued to the district court." Id. Thus, the Holland Court decided that the "challenge to
the stop constitutes a new issue that cannot be raised on appeal." Id.
Conversely, Mr. Tappin expressly raised the issue of the traffic stop to the district
court.

Unlike the defendant in Holland, 135 Idaho at 161, Mr. Tappin did not raise

alternative grounds for suppression for the first time on appeal. He did not challenge
the search in district court and then only on appeal challenge the traffic stop.

Cf

Holland, 135 Idaho at 161. Rather, Mr. Tappin's motion to suppress and argument on
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appeal contain the same ground for suppressing the evidence, i.e., that the officers'
traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. (R., pp.56-57, App. Br., pp.6-13.) Thus,
this case is distinguishable from Holland, because Mr. Tappin expressly raised the issue
of the traffic stop to the district court.

C.

Alternatively, The District Court May Address Mr. Tappin's Issue On Appeal
Because It Was Decided By The District Court
Alternatively, Mr. Tappin asserts that even if this issue had not been raised to the

district court in his motion to suppress, this Court may address his issue on appeal
because it was decided by the district court.
As discussed above, "ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal."

DuValt, 131 Idaho at 553.

"An exception to this rule, however, has been

applied by this Court when the issue was argued to or decided by the trial court." Id.
(citing Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351, 356-57 (1990)).
In DuValt, the State argued that the defendant's issue of whether the use of
handcuffs on the defendant was a reasonable means to execute an investigatory stop
"may not be raised on appeal because it was not raised to the trial court." Id. However,
the district court in DuValt "stated that '[d]efendant contends that he was illegally
arrested when he was handcuffed and patted down . . . The handcuffing during this
investigatory stop was a reasonable means to execute the investigatory stop."' Id. The
Idaho Supreme Court concluded that, "[s]ince this issue was directly addressed by the
trial court below, we will decide this issue on appeal." Id.
Similarly, in this case the issue of whether the officers had reasonable suspicion
to lawfully expand the traffic stop for investigation into drug activity and the
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effectiveness of Mr. Tappin's consent to search was decided by the district court. Here,
the district court concluded that "[o]nce the stop occurred, nothing precluded the officer
from asking [Mr. Tappin] for his consent to a search."

(R., p.78.)

That statement

indicates that the district court considered whether the expansion of the traffic stop for
investigation into drug activity had any effect on Mr. Tappin's consent.

Because the

issue raised by Mr. Tappin was, at the least, indirectly addressed by the district court,
this Court may decide the issue on appeal. See DuValt, 131 Idaho at 553.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Tappin respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 25th day of June, 2013.

~

r

~

--~----

BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY~
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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